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Abstract
Should the law restrict liability of defaulting borrowers? We abstract from possible bene-
ﬁts arising from limited rationality or risk-aversion of borrowers, contractual incompleteness,
or lender moral hazard. We focus instead on general equilibrium implications of liability rules
with moral hazard among borrowers with varying wealth. If lenders are on the short side
of the market, weakening liability rules lower lender proﬁts, may cause additional exclusion
among the poor, but generate additional rents for wealthier borrowers. For certain changes in
liability rules (such as a ban on bonded labor, or weakening bankruptcy rules below a wealth
threshold) they also raise productivity among borrowers of intermediate wealth. Hence they
can be interpreted as a form of eﬃciency-enhancing redistribution from lenders and poor
borrowers to middle class borrowers. Our model provides a possible rationale for why weaker
liability rules are observed in wealthier countries.
1 Introduction
Legal limits on the liability of borrowers vary extensively across countries, and are the subject
of extensive policy debates. Some poor countries such as Nepal exhibit and have until recently
legally permitted contracts with bonded labor provisions, which are banned in most countries.
Nevertheless many poor countries frequently exhibit occurrence of bonded labor, especially with
respect to children.3 Most countries operate under some form of bankruptcy law that limit bor-
rower liability. The extent of bankruptcy protection varies considerably across countries: e.g.,
1Department of Economics, University of Frankfurt
2Department of Economics, Boston University
3For a description of bonded labor contracts in diﬀerent developing countries see U.S. Department of Labor
(2005). The Nepalese Kamaiya system is a well-known example (see also Joshi (2003) and Edmonds and Sharma
(2005)). These contracts were declared illegal by the Nepal government in 2000. As the US Department of Labor
report states: “Loans are a central feature for maintaining the Kamaiya system. Since Kamaiyas are generally not
1traditional Chapter 7 bankruptcy rules in the US limit liability much more than in Germany.
Defaulting borrowers with wealth below a limit can essentially walk away from their debts under
Chapter 7, while in German law a substantial fraction of their future earnings are required to be
transferred to their creditors.4
From the perspective of contract theory, it is not evident that there should be any legally
imposed limits on borrower liability at all. Borrowers and lenders could select liability provisions
themselves and write them directly into credit contracts. Legal restrictions on these liabilities
eﬀectively disallow certain contracts with stricter liability provisions. If agents are rational and
can foresee the future consequences of contractual provisions, it is not clear why the law needs
to restrict their freedom to choose strict liability provisions.
Indeed, it is frequently argued that these liability restrictions are unfair, ineﬃcient and sig-
niﬁcantly impair the functioning of credit markets. The inability of a given borrower-lender pair
to choose contracts with strict liability provisions restricts the set of feasible contracts, resulting
in a Pareto-inferior outcome. Weak liability rules limit the capacity of borrowers to precommit
to repaying their loans, causing many to be excluded from the credit market. Others who do
manage to secure credit are provided lower incentives to prevent default, raising default risk an-
ticipated by lenders and the interest rates they are charged. These eﬀects are more severe, the
poorer the borrowers are. Empirical evidence supporting these claims have been made both in
cross-country as well as cross-state analysis of correlations between lender rights and access of
borrowers to ﬁnance (La Porta et al (1997, 1998), Gropp, Scholz and White (1997), Berkowitz
and White (2000)). From this perspective, the best legal regimes are those with the strongest
paid enough to meet their basic needs, many have no choice but to take loans from their master. Many also carry
inherited debts, sometimes going back for three or four generations, in addition to their own. A Kamaiya burdened
by debt must continue to work for the same landlord until the debt has been repaid. The Kamaiya remains bound
to the landlord unless, at markets held each winter, the Kamaiya ﬁnds a new master to pay oﬀ his debt or the
original master sells oﬀ the Kaimaya and his family to a new master”.
4Recent reforms in personal bankruptcy law in the US have, however, imposed exemption limits for Chapter
7 ﬁlings above which debtors can ﬁle for bankruptcy only under Chapter 13 which requires a repayment plan. In
German law, every bankrupt debtor has to hand over a well deﬁned fraction of his income for the next six years.
For example, a single person is allowed to keep all of his income up to a limit of 930 Euros. 70% of the income
between 930 and 3020 Euros, and 100% income above 3020 Euros, has to be handed over to debtors for the next
four years, with 10–15% lower rates for the ﬁfth and sixth years. In the seventh year, the bankrupt person is debt
free and can undertake a ”fresh start”.
2possible protection of lender rights.
Carrying this logic to an extreme, one is also led to question the existence of restrictions
on bonded labor. From a consequentialist perspective, it makes little sense to not allow rational
borrowers to commit themselves to providing indentured services to lenders should they lack the
resources to repay their loans. The normative argument for banning bonded labor would have to
be based either on lack of rationality or foresight of borrowers, or on deontological freedom-based
principles. From a positive standpoint, the widespread prevalence of weak liability rules could be
explained by the strong tension between their ex post costs and ex ante beneﬁts. Once borrowers
are in a state of distress, courts, politicians, the media and public opinion tend to be reluctant
to allow well-to-do lenders and banks from implementing draconian measures to recover their
debts. Yet economists argue that such practices are short-sighted and mistaken, weakening ex
ante incentives that end up hurting borrowers in general.
Some arguments have been advanced in the literature for limiting lender rights. Manove et
al (2001) argue that lenders may also be subject to incentive problems with respect to adequate
screening and monitoring activities, which necessitate exposing them to some costs when the
projects of their borrowers fail. Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) make a case for weak lender pro-
tection when credit contracts are incomplete and borrowers are risk-averse. Limiting borrower
liability may then provide them useful insurance. Additional arguments for borrower protection
may be advanced if borrowers do not rationally evaluate future consequences of strict liability
rules.
In this paper we argue that even with complete contracts, rational risk-neutral agents, and ab-
sence of any incentive problems for lenders, there can be a coherent rationale for limiting borrower
liability under speciﬁc circumstances (relating to the distribution of wealth and concentration in
the credit market). The rationale arises from general equilibrium eﬀects of liability restrictions
in the presence of borrower moral hazard, which cause redistribution of rents from lenders to
borrowers. Weaker liability rules limit the ability of lenders to extract rents from borrowers,
causing equilibrium proﬁt rates earned by lenders to decline. In a moral hazard environment,
this (indirect) general equilibrium redistribution eﬀect tends to increase borrower ex ante utility
and eﬀort levels, in contrast to the (direct) adverse eﬀect of weaker precommitment ability of
borrowers when liability rules are weakened.
3We construct a model where proﬁt rates are determined by stable matching allocations of
borrowers and lenders, similar to two-sided matching market models of Gale and Shapley (1962)
and Roth (2002). With heterogeneity of wealth among borrowers, the equilibrium proﬁt is equal
to that in the monopolistically optimal contract for lenders with respect to the poorest borrower
that receives a credit contract. Owing to competition among lenders, wealthier borrowers capture
all the rents from their superior ability to post collateral. Restricting liability of borrowers then
reduces the ability of lenders to extract rents from poorer agents, thus reducing the equilibrium
proﬁt rate, which beneﬁts wealthier borrowers and encourages them to select higher eﬀort (owing
to lower ‘debt overhang’). At the same time the lower ability to precommit to repayment adversely
aﬀects their utility and eﬀort. The latter eﬀect is more severe, the poorer the borrower. The
poorest borrowers may end up getting excluded altogether from the credit market. But the direct
eﬀect of reduced commitment ability is weaker for wealthier borrowers, for whom the favorable
indirect general equilibrium eﬀect is just as strong. So wealthier borrowers may beneﬁt from
weaker liability rules. In general, weaker liability rules result in a redistribution from lenders
(and possibly poor borrowers) to ‘middle-class’ borrowers. When general equilibrium eﬀects are
incorporated, they do not result in a Pareto-inferior outcome.
An important question then concerns the eﬃciency eﬀects of this form of redistribution. We
consider two diﬀerent contexts. In the ﬁrst, borrowers are protected by bankruptcy law and
bonded labor is banned. We consider the eﬀects of weakening provisions of bankruptcy law, e.g.,
for the fraction of subsequent earnings of defaulting borrowers required to be transferred to their
debtors. This generally hurts poor borrowers and beneﬁts wealthier borrowers in terms of their
ex ante utilities. The corresponding eﬀort eﬀects depend on the precise manner in which the
law is weakened. If a constant fraction has to be transferred, lowering the fraction causes eﬀort
of all borrowers to decline. If on the other hand, it is lowered only for poor borrowers, then
eﬀort of wealthier borrowers is raised — since their repayment commitment is unaﬀected, so only
the favorable general equilibrium eﬀect operates. Somewhat paradoxically, weakening the law
selectively for the poor ends up beneﬁting the non-poor more.
In the second setting, we assume that a strong bankruptcy law is in place, and evaluate
the eﬀect of bonded labor. When permitted, bonded labor provisions arise only for agents with
wealth below a threshold. For wealthier borrowers a ban on bonded labor has no direct adverse
4impact, since they do not employ any. If marginal borrowers are poorer than the threshold, and
the lenders are on the short side of the market, lender proﬁts decline owing to the restriction
on their ability to extract rents from the poorest borrowers. For borrowers with wealth above
the threshold, then, only the general equilibrium eﬀect operates, and both eﬀort and utilities
rise. Poor borrowers on the other hand may suﬀer as they may lose access to credit, and eﬀort
declines owing to the primacy of the direct eﬀect of weaker precommitment ability. If the wealth
distribution of borrowers is more concentrated among ‘middle class’ rather than the poor, a ban
on bonded labor (similar to weakening bankruptcy law only for the poor) can then be a form of
redistribution which also raises eﬃciency.
In either setting, the presence of suﬃcient ‘middle class’ borrowers can provide the basis for
weakening liability rules. If on the other hand poor borrowers predominate, concern for their
welfare can motivate strong liability rules. In poor countries, thus, bonded labor may be justiﬁed
as a means of widening credit access. More developed countries with a large middle class may
instead seek to ban bonded labor, and use bankruptcy law to limit borrower liability. Within such
countries, the argument for or against weakening bankruptcy law depends on the distribution of
wealth, on how concentrated credit markets are, and societal trade-oﬀs between eﬃciency and
redistribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relation to existing literature. Section
3 introduces the model. Section 4 considers the case of bankruptcy law, when bonded labor is
banned. Section 5 studies the eﬀect of banning bonded labor. Section 6 discusses some extensions
and applications.
2 Related Literature
Several studies examine cross-sectional variation across diﬀerent countries or states states with
diﬀering personal bankruptcy laws. La Porta et al (1997) use empirical measures of protection of
lender rights to explain cross-country variation in availability of external ﬁnancing to the private
sector. They ﬁnd that countries with less extensive lender rights (such as those with legal origins
in French civil law) have narrower debt markets. Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) use 1983 Survey
of Consumer Finances data to examine eﬀects of diﬀering bankruptcy law in diﬀerent US states
5on debt and interest rates. Their main ﬁndings are that poor agents are adversely aﬀected by
a weak bankruptcy law. Interest rates are higher (only) for poorer agents if bankruptcy law is
weak. Moreover, poor agents are more likely to be denied credit if bankruptcy law is weak. At the
same time, the propensity of richer agents to receive credit is higher under a weaker bankruptcy
law. These ﬁndings are consistent with the predictions of our model.
Berkowitz and White (2004) also use the variation in exemption levels but focus on the
availability of credit to small enterprises. Since small ﬁrms are often not incorporated, their
owner is personally liable for all ﬁnancial obligations of the ﬁrm. Since bankruptcy law deﬁnes
the extent to which the owner can be held liable, bankruptcy law can be expected to aﬀect credit
access. They ﬁnd that small ﬁrms are more likely to be denied credit in ﬁrms with high exemption
levels, i.e., subject to a weaker bankruptcy law. Interestingly, the probability of credit denial is
increasing in the exemption level but only for low wealth levels. For ﬁrms with high net assets,
they ﬁnd the overall eﬀect is close to zero.
Among theoretical arguments for a weak bankruptcy law owing to incomplete contracts,
Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) consider an agricultural economy subject to macroeconomic shocks.
While farmers (debtors) and lenders can use debt contracts to enable production and give in-
centives to work hard, they write insurance contracts that are not contingent on macroeconomic
shocks. As a result, ex post intervention of the government has a potentially beneﬁcial aspect
because it helps provide insurance to farmers. This is true even if the intervention is anticipated.
Similarly, insurance advantages of a weak bankruptcy law are stressed by Gropp, Scholz and
White (1997) and Fan and White (2003).
Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) provide an alternative argument for weak bankruptcy
law, in terms of the need to provide banks with incentives to screen investment projects. In
their model, only lenders have the expertise to ascertain project quality by engaging in a costly
screening process. They show that in a competitive credit market, equilibrium loan contracts
will be designed with excessively high collateral requirements that leave lenders with insuﬃcient
incentives to screen projects. Legal restrictions on collateral mitigate this ineﬃciency. If the credit
market were more monopolistic, this ineﬃciency also tends to be mitigated as lenders internalize
the eﬀects of superior project quality.
Concerning bonded labor, Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) discuss their role in motivating
6eﬀort incentives and risk-taking, but do not provide a welfare analysis. Srinivasan (1980, 1989)
examines determinants of worker preferences for bonded labor clauses vis-a-vis credit contracts
where default is followed by denial of credit in the future, and their eﬀects on technological
innovation. However, he does not provide a welfare analysis of bonded labor laws. Genicot (2002)
provides an argument for banning bonded labor used by a monopolistic landlord to preempt
competition from a moneylender who cannot employ bonded labor. In her model, banning bonded
labor generates greater competition between the landlord and the moneylender, and thus may
increase welfare for poor farmers.
The contrast between partial equilibrium and general equilibrium eﬀects of imposing legal
restrictions on contracts is similar to arguments presented by Bardhan (1989), Basu (1989), Basu
and Van (1998) and Kanbur (2001). Basu (1989) investigates the welfare implications of banning
sexual harrasment on the workplace. In Basu and Van (1998) a ban of child labor is analyzed.
While banning child labor renders every family (slightly) worse oﬀ in partial equilibrium, these
eﬀects might be overturned by the general equilibrium impact on the wage rate. Braverman and
Stiglitz (1982) also discuss cases of interlinked labor-credit or tenancy-credit contracts which may
be welfare reducing for either landlord or workers when general equilibrium eﬀects are taken into
account.
The role of eviction threats as supplementary incentive devices is discussed in Banerjee, Gertler
and Ghatak (2002) and Banerjee and Ghatak (2004). These incentive eﬀects are similar to bonded
labor but involve no deadweight losses with full commitment on the principal’s part. Only with
a hold-up problem (limited commitment ability of the principal) do they give rise to ex ante
ineﬃciencies (though no ex post ineﬃciencies). A ban on eviction threats (only) in that case can
be welfare improving.
3 The model
The economy has a given population of m principals and n agents. A principal and agent pair,
once matched, can jointly invest in an upfront investment I to start a project. Each agent can
work on at most one project. It is simplest to consider the case where a similar restriction is
imposed on principals as well (motivated by the limited time available to the principal to screen
7loan applicants and monitor progress of the project). However, the results are unaﬀected as long
as there are given capacity limits in terms of the number of projects each principal can fund, and
there are at least two distinct principals.5
Each agent has a given level of wealth w to start with; without loss of generality this is less than
I, the upfront investment needed for the project (since others will self-ﬁnance). Principals have
enough wealth to pay the upfront investment. In case an agent or principal does not participate
in the project they each earn zero from it. Agents are distinguished from one another only by
their wealth, while all principals are identical.
Once a principal and agent are matched and participate in the project, they enter into a
contract which describes how ﬁnancing and returns from the project are shared among them.
The returns to the project are stochastic. With probability e the project is a success; the state
of the world will be called good, and denoted by s. In that case the project return is ys. With
probability 1−e the project fails, the state of the world is bad, denoted by f, and the corresponding
return is yf <y s.
The agent’s eﬀort determines the probability of a good state. Investing eﬀort is costly and
causes eﬀort costs D(e) which are strictly convex, thrice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, with
D   (e) ≥ 0.6
We shall additionally assume that (i) ys >I>y f, so that the project is never going to be
viable if the agent selects zero eﬀort, and (ii) there exists a level of eﬀort e at which the project
is viable, i.e., e(ys − yf)+yf >I+ D(e).
After the project has been completed, the agent can work l hours on a spot labor market
and earn an income of R · l. This opportunity to work on the spot market arises irrespective
of whether the agent participated in the project. Working on the spot labor market causes an
additional eﬀort cost g(l) to the agent. In the event that the agent defaulted on the ﬁnancial
contract, the spot market provides an opportunity to supplement earnings that can be used to
5Corresponding results for the case of a single monopolist principal can be derived from analysis of the P-
optimal contracts. In this case the general equilibrium eﬀects will not appear, and the comparative statics with
respect to liability rules will be quite diﬀerent.
6The assumption on convexity of marginal disutility of eﬀort simpliﬁes the analysis considerably, as it implies
that the cost of providing the agent with appropriate eﬀort incentives (i.e., inclusive of the incentive rents) is
convex.
8pay back debt to the principal. Alternatively if bonded labor is permitted, the ex ante contract
with the principal can specify an extent of labor that the agent is required to provide on behalf
of the principal.
3.1 Contracts, Legal Regimes and Sequence of Moves
Once a principal and agent are matched, their interaction is structured as follows.
In Stage 1, the principal and the agent write a contract which speciﬁes their respective con-
tributions to the upfront investment I, ﬁnancial transfers and (if bonded labor is permitted) spot
market labor services to be provided by the agent to the principal ex post, contingent on the
realized state of the world. Therefore, a contract will be {IA,˜ ti,˜ li}i=s,f, where IA denotes the
contribution of the agent to the upfront investment, ˜ ti is the ﬁnancial transfer from the agent to
the principal in state i, and ˜ li the labor services provided (as a bonded laborer) for the principal.
If the law forbids bonded labor, then ˜ li is constrained to equal zero. Moreover, transfers must be
ﬁnancially feasible for the agent to pay out of the project returns alone, so the contract does not
have to condition on future labor market earnings of the agent. Hence IA ≤ w,˜ ti ≤ w − IA + yi.
Note that if the legal regime permits the contract to mandate a payment exceeding w − IA + yi,
this is tantamount to allowing bonded labor. The key assumption is that transfers ﬁnanced out
of project earnings or agent wealth (prior to working on the spot market) entail no deadweight
costs, in contrast to any supplementary transfer ﬁnanced by subsequent earnings of defaulting
borrowers.
At Stage 2, the agent selects eﬀort e.
At Stage 3, the state of the world i is realized. The agent and the principal can then renegotiate
the ﬁnancial contract, from ˜ ti,˜ li to ti,l i, if and only if both agree to the replacement. The only
constraint that the new contract must satisfy is that ti ≤ w − IA + yi.
After this, the subsequent actions and consequences depend on the legal framework within
which the principal and agent function. To start with, consider the following two polar legal
settings.
In the ﬁrst, bonded labor is banned and contract liability is enforced by a bankruptcy law,
which gives the agent freedom to default on the contract, and decide how much labor to provide
9subsequently on the spot market. The law mandates some punitive transfers P that the agent
must pay to the principal, a function of the ex post wealth w − IA, project returns yi and spot
labor market earnings R.li of the agent. There are some deadweight losses associated with the
enforcement of these punitive transfers, given by a function Q(P) which is strictly increasing,
convex and twice diﬀerentiable, with Q(0) = 0. The principal thus receives P − Q(P). These
include the legal and other costs incurred by the principal in recovering payments from defaulters.
In such a setting, at Stage 4 of the contract the agent decides whether or not to default on
the obligation to pay ti to the principal. In either case, the agent subsequently decides how much
labor to provide on the spot market. If he does not default, none of these spot market earnings are
owed to the principal: ti is the actual ex post transfer. If the agent defaults, the agent is compelled
to pay P(li,w− IA,y i) to the principal. The punitive transfer must satisfy the constraint that
such a payment is ex post feasible for the agent, hence P(li,w− IA,y i) ≤ R.li + w − IA + yi.
The bankruptcy law speciﬁes the exact formula by which P is determined. In some countries
(such as Chapter 7 provisions in the US) it allows transfer of wealth but not of subsequent labor
earnings, while in others (such as Germany) it allows for transfer of part of subsequent labor
earnings as well. This aﬀects the extent of ex post ineﬃciency associated with default — besides
the enforcement deadweight costs — the implicit taxation of subsequent labor market earnings
results in undersupply of spot market labor. To illustrate the implications of diﬀerent bankruptcy
laws, we shall consider for most part a linear form for punitive transfers, which consist of the
sum of a ﬁxed fraction α(≤ 1) of ex post earnings R.li and a fraction β(≤ 1) of residual wealth
w−IA+yi,s oP(li,w−IA,y i)=α[R.li]+β[w−IA+yi]. The parameters α and β then represent
the strength of the bankruptcy law.
The other polar setting we shall consider involves strict enforcement of contracts and bonded
labor is legally allowed. In these cases, the agent is not free to choose his ex post labor supply, and
is bound by the contractual terms (for both ﬁnancial transfers and bonded labor). The law does
not stipulate any limits to the agent’s liability, apart from the restriction that ﬁnancial transfers
be feasible for the agent, already built into the terms of the contract. Any additional transfers
to the principal can be ﬁnanced by the agent working on the spot market, as stipulated by the
bonded labor clauses in the contract. We assume that the enforcement of bonded labor provisions
of the contract entails some deadweight costs for the principal. So if the agent provides li services
10to the principal as per the contract, this will be subject to a deadweight loss q(li) incurred by
the principal, where q( 0 )=0 ,q is a strictly increasing, convex and twice diﬀerentiable function.
The net return to the principal in state i will then be ti + R.li − q(li). Further assumptions on
these deadweight costs will be presented later, which essentially restrict the curvature of the q
function.
In eﬀect, both bonded labor and bankruptcy entail ex post deadweight losses, consisting
of possible ex post oversupply of labor, and enforcement costs. Accordingly contracts will be
structured ex ante to minimize their use. The interpretation of bonded labor is that it represents
a means used by the principal to relax ex post limited liability constraints for poor agents, arising
out of the need to ensure the agent has nonnegative consumption. Financial transfers will be
used to the maximal extent permissible by the agent’s wealth and project returns. If these prove
insuﬃcient to generate a required rate of return for the principal, supplementary bonded labor
obligations are permitted. They will be used, at an ex post cost, in order to ensure an adequate
ex ante return to the principal. When bonded labor is permitted, the contract stipulates these,
reducing scope for ex post discretion for the agent with respect to subsequent spot labor market
supply. When bonded labor is illegal and there is bankruptcy law instead, the agent has greater
ex post discretion — whether to pay ti, or seek refuge in bankruptcy which may reduce the
transfers that the agent has to eventually pay. The agent retains control over its subsequent spot
market labor supply — though these are subject to taxation — and therefore the magnitude of
the eventual transfers.
Finally, in order to illustrate the eﬀects of a ban on bonded labor, we shall consider a third,
intermediate regime, where the law continues to enforce the ﬁnancial transfers stipulated by the
contract. This corresponds to a world without bonded labor but a strong bankruptcy law which
allows no freedom to agents to default on the ﬁnancial terms of their contract.7
We thus consider three diﬀerent legal settings in all. The ﬁrst is one where bonded labor
is banned, and bankruptcy law may limit ex post ﬁnancial transfers. In this setting the game
continues beyond Stage 3 as follows. At Stage 4, the agent decides whether or not to default on
the contract. If he defaults by not providing paying ti to the principal, the law will enforce the
7Implicitly this must be backed up by sanctions for default that are suﬃciently credible and punitive that
default does not arise on the equilibrium path.
11mandatory ﬁnancial transfer rule P. Finally, at stage 5 the agent selects spot market labor supply
li. If he has defaulted he pays P to the principal (who receives P − Q(P)), otherwise he pays
only ti (who receives ti). The agent ends up with a net payoﬀ of w −IA +yi −P(li,w−IA,y i)+
R.li − g(li) − D(e) in the former case, and w − IA + yi − ti + R.li − g(li) − D(e) in the latter.
In the intermediate setting with a strong bankruptcy law but with a ban on bonded labor,
the agent is compelled to pay ti as per the terms of the contract at Stage 4. Then at Stage 5, he
selects his ex post labor supply ˆ li, to end up with a net payoﬀ of w−IA+yi−ti+R.ˆ li−g(ˆ li)−D(e).
In the last setting there is a strong bankruptcy law, and bonded labor is allowed without
restriction. At Stage 4 the agent is compelled to pay ti to the principal, as well as provide bonded
labor services of li. Finally at Stage 5, he decides whether to provide any supplementary labor
supply ˆ li. The agent then ends up with an ex post payoﬀ of w−IA+yi−ti+R.ˆ li−g(li+ˆ li)−D(e).
4 Bankruptcy without Bonded Labor
In this section we consider the ﬁrst legal setting described above, and illustrate the implications
of varying provisions of bankruptcy law (e.g., represented by the parameter α).
Consider the decision of the agent at Stage 4 whether to declare bankruptcy. If the agent
decides to default, he has to make a payment of β ·[w − IA + y]+α·(R·l) to the principal. This
gives him (1−β)·[w − IA + y]+(1−α)·(R·l)−g(l)−D(e) as utility. His consumption will be
(1 − β) · [w − IA + y]+( 1− α) · (R · l).
The utility of the agent depends on the amount of labor he is willing to bring forward in
period t = 4. After declaring bankruptcy, the agent will choose l ≥ 0 to maximize (1 − β) ·
[w − IA + y]+( 1− α) · (R · l) − g(l). The solution is denoted by l∗(α,R) and implicitly given
by (1 − α) · R = g (l∗(α,R)). The eventual proﬁt of the principal in case of bankruptcy will be
β · [w − IA + y]+α · R · l∗(α,R) − (I − IA).
If on the other hand the agent does not declare bankruptcy, he will pay ti to the principal.
This allows him to consume w−IA−ti+R·l. The utility will be w−IA−ti+R·l−g(l)−D(e).
The optimal level of labor is derived as in the case of bankruptcy and equals l∗(0,R).
12The agent will choose not to declare bankruptcy if the no-default condition
(1 − β) · (w − IA)+( 1− α) · R · l∗(α,R) − g(l∗(α,R)) (1)
≤ w − IA − ti + R · l∗(0,R) − g(l∗(0,R))
holds. It turns out that every contract that fulﬁlls the no default constraint will be renegotiation
proof, and attention can be restricted to such contracts.
Proposition 1 (i) On the equilibrium path an agent will not declare bankruptcy.
(ii) Attention can be restricted to renegotiation proof contracts.
(iii) Contracts are renegotiation proof if and only if they fulﬁll the no-default condition (1).
Proof. (i) Suppose the agent declares bankruptcy under a given contract. Then the principal
will receive a transfer which is at most β · (w − IA)+α · R · l∗(α,R), i.e., the punitive transfers
mandated by the law, less the legal cost to the principal of enforcing these transfers. Moreover,
owing to α<1 the agent will undersupply labor subsequently. Then there exists a Pareto-
dominating contract which avoids these distortions, in which the agent is required to make the
alternative transfer ˆ ti = β · (w − IA)+α · R · l∗(α,R)+γ, where γ is a small positive number,
chosen so that 0 <γ<[R · l∗(0,R) − g(l∗(0,R)] − [R · l∗(α,R) − g(l∗(α,R)]. This implies that
the new transfer ˆ ti is smaller than previously mandated ˜ ti, so continues to be a feasible transfer
(i.e, ˆ ti < ˜ ti ≤ w − IA + yi). Moreover, by construction the new contract satisﬁes the no-default
condition strictly, so the agent will not default on the contract. Then both the agent and the
principal are better oﬀ.
(ii) Take a contract C that is renegotiated and let the ﬁnal contract be C . The contract C 
must be renegotiation proof. The initial contract C can now be replaced by the new contract C .
(iii) If a contract fulﬁlls (1), it is optimal for the agent to not declare bankruptcy, whence no
ex post ineﬃciencies occur and there is no scope for renegotiation.
To see that every renegotiation proof contract fulﬁlls (1), suppose to the contrary that this
were not true. Then there exists a contract which is renegotiation proof, yet violates (1). The
argument in (i) can be used to show that the original contract can be Pareto-dominated by an
alternative contract, contradicting the premise that the contract is renegotiation-proof.
13Every legal contract leads to a utility level the agent can achieve as well as an eﬀort level the
agent will choose. Therefore, it is convenient to describe contracts in economic terms: specifying
state-contingent indirect utilities for the agent, along with the induced eﬀort {vi,e}i=s,f. Indirect
utility (net of eﬀort disutility) in the good state of the world is deﬁned as vi ≡ yi + w − IA −
ti + R · l∗(0,R) − g(l∗(0,R)). Moreover, the ex post surplus is Si ≡ yi + S(R), where S(R) ≡
R·l∗(0,R)−g(l∗(0,R)). The expected proﬁt of the principal is then π = e·[w −IA −vs +Ss]+
(1 − e) · [w − IA − vf + Sf] − (I − IA)=w − I + e · (Ss − vs)+( 1− e) · (Sf − vf). The expected
utility for the agent is V = e · vs +( 1− e) · vf − D(e).
Using standard arguments, attention can be restricted to contracts characterized by the fol-
lowing constraints.
IC : vs − vf = D  (e)
LL : vf ≥ (1 − β) · (w − IA)+( 1− α) · R · l∗(α,R) − g(l∗(α,R))
PCA : e · vs +( 1− e) · vf − D(e) ≥ w + S(R)
PCP : e · (Ss − vs)+( 1− e) · (Sf − vf) − (I − w) ≥ 0
The incentive compatibility constraint IC characterizes the eﬀort chosen by the agent. The
constraint LL is the no-default constraint in the bad state, which also implies the validity of
the no-default condition in the good state (since w.l.o.g. vs >v f; otherwise e = 0 owing to IC
and then the good state never arises). It can be viewed as a limit on the ex post liability of the
agent. By the previous proposition, it ensures that the contract is also renegotiation proof. The
participation constraints ensure that both the agent and the principal receive at least as much
as in autarky.
Note that w.l.o.g. the contract will require the agent invest his entire ex ante wealth upfront
IA = w, with the principal funding the rest. This leaves ex ante payoﬀs of both unaﬀected, as well
as all constraints except LL, which is weakened. From now onwards we shall restrict attention to
such contracts. The value of β is then irrelevant; the strength of bankruptcy law is represented
solely by the parameter α.
A weaker bankruptcy law (e.g., a lower α) increases the ex post utility of the agent associated
with the default option, limiting credible promises by the agent to repay the principal, thus
ultimately restricting the set of ex ante feasible contracts. It appears to be in the interest of
14neither principal nor the agent, if we abstract from general equilibrium considerations. Note that
if the contract could stipulate punitive payments in the event of default, subject to an upper
bound set by the law, it would be (privately) optimal for every contracting pair of principal and
agent to set default payments at this upper bound.
4.1 Matching
We now analyze the general equilibrium implications of bankruptcy law. Our economy is charac-
terized by a set A = {a} of agents with diﬀering wealth wa and a set P = {j} of principals. In
what follows we describe the case where each principal can fund at most one project, though the
results extend straightforwardly when this is relaxed and there are at least two competing prin-
cipals. Each matched pair of principal and agent with wealth w can select a contract {vi,e}i=s,f
from the set Γ(w) of contracts satisfying constraints IC, LL, PCA and PCP.
An allocation is a matching of principals and agents (with all unmatched principals/agents
remaining inactive), and a contract C ∈ Γ(wa) for every matched (a,j) pair. The resulting payoﬀ
for the principal j is π = e · [Ss − vs]+( 1− e) · [Sf − vf] − (I − w) and for the agent a is
e · vs +( 1− e) · vf − D(e).
Deﬁnition: An allocation is stable if there does not exist any pair (a,j) that could select a
deviating contract ˜ C ∈ Γ(wa) that would make both better oﬀ.
An agent a is said to be viable if there exists a feasible contract for that agent, i.e., Γ(wa)
is nonempty. Note that bankruptcy law (represented by α) aﬀects the set of feasible contracts
for any given agent, so can alter the set of viable agents. A higher value of α weakens the LL
constraint, thus permitting the set of viable agents to expand. For any given α, the set of viable
agents is simply the set of agents with wealth above a critical threshold. Let n denote the number
of viable agents. Order viable agents in order of their wealth: w1 ≥ w2 ≥ ... Let m denote the
number of principals (more generally, the maximum number of projects that can be funded,
aggregating across all the principals).
A simple characterization of stable allocations can now be provided. For this we need the
following deﬁnitions.
P-optimal contract A P-optimal contract for a viable agent with wealth w is the contract that
15maximizes the payoﬀ of the principal π = e·[Ss −vs]+(1−e)·[Sf −vf]−(I −w) over the
set Γ(w) of feasible contracts. The resulting proﬁt will be denoted πP(w).
A-optimal Contract An A-optimal contract corresponding to proﬁt target π is one which
maximizes the agent’s expected payoﬀ over the set of feasible contracts Γ(w) satisfying the
constraint that the principal attains an expected payoﬀ of at least π, provided at least one
such contract exists. The optimized utility is denoted U(π).
Proposition 2 Stable allocations exist. In every stable allocation
(A) the number of agents that will be matched is at most Q = min{n,m} and equal to Q for
generic distributions of wealth. Moreover, the Q-richest agents are matched with a principal.





∈ [max{πP(wm+1),0},πP(wm)], if m ≤ n;
=0 , if m>n .
, (2)
(C) Every matched agent a gets an A-optimal contract subject to the constraint that the proﬁt
of the principal must be at least π.
The idea is simple — the market consists of a population of n viable agents with heterogeneous
wealth, and m identical principals. Competition among the latter implies that all principals must
earn the same proﬁt, deﬁned by the marginal viable agent, with all ‘rents’ for intramarginal
agents accruing entirely to those agents. The only source of indeterminacy arises when there is a
wealth gap between the last matched agent, and the next wealthiest one — with a large number of
agents this indeterminacy shrinks. In what follows we shall resolve this indeterminacy (somewhat
arbitrarily) by setting π = πP(wm), i.e., awarding all the surplus between the last matched
agent and the principal to the latter. The structure of contracts and payoﬀs resulting in stable
allocations can then be understood as an interaction between those of P-optimal and A-optimal
contracts. The contract received by the marginal matched agent is the P-optimal contract for that
agent. The corresponding proﬁt πP(wm) is the proﬁt earned by all principals. All other wealthier
agents receive the A-optimal contract corresponding to the minimum proﬁt target πP(wm). This
16characterization will be used to derive the implications of changing bankruptcy law (parameter
α).
Note that the notion of a stable allocation is related to the core, but not identical to it. It
corresponds to the core when only coalitions of a single principal and agent are allowed to form.
Coalitions of agents are not allowed to form: conceivably in this setting with wealth constraints
there is scope for coalitions of agents to engage in ROSCA-like wealth lotteries. This requires the
use of randomized contracts, which remain beyond the purview of this paper.
Before proceeding to examine the eﬀect of varying the strength of bankruptcy law, it is useful
to note key qualitative features of P-optimal and A-optimal contracts.
Lemma 3 (i) In a P-optimal contract, there exist thresholds w1,w 2(>w 1) such that (a) for
a viable agent with wealth w below w1 the optimal eﬀort is e∗ which maximizes e(Ss −
Sf) − eD (e), and vf = Lα, so LL binds but APC does not; (b) for wealth between w1 and
w2 the optimal eﬀort is eα(w) ∈ (e∗,e FB) which solves w + S(R)=Lα + eD (e) − D(e),
and vf = Lα, so both LL and APC bind; (c) for w ≥ w2 the optimal eﬀort is eFB and
vf = w + S(R) − eFBD (eFB)+D(eFB), so LL does not bind while APC does.
(ii) In an A-optimal contract relative to Π, the optimal eﬀort ˆ e(Π,L α,w) is
min{˜ e(Π,L α,w),e FB}, where ˜ e(Π,L α,w) is the largest e solving
S(e,w) ≡ e(Ss − Sf)+Sf − e D (e)+w − I = Lα +Π , (3)
and vf = w − I + S(ˆ e(Π,L α,w),w). The agent attains an expected utility of
F(ˆ e(Π,L α,w),w)−Π, where F(e,w) ≡ e(Ss−Sf)+Sf +w−I−D(e) denotes the ﬁrst-best
surplus.
The nature of optimal eﬀorts is shown in Figure 1. Only agents with wealth above w are viable.
The P-optimal contract provides rents to poor agents with wealth between w and w1, and imple-
ments the same eﬀort e∗ for any wealth in this region. In the unsuccessful state the agent gets
a utility equal to the liability limit Lα, and an additional incentive rent D (e∗) in the successful
state. This generates expected utility Lα+e∗D (e∗)−D(e∗) which is higher than the agent’s out-
side option. An agent with wealth w1 is exactly indiﬀerent between this ‘eﬃciency wage’ contract











Figure 1: Eﬀort in P-Optimal and A-Optimal contracts
to induce them to participate: accordingly these agents are provided a higher incentive rent in the
successful state, motivating them to choose higher eﬀort, while payment in the unsuccessful state
is the same as in the eﬃciency wage contract, so the LL constraint continues to bind. Eﬀort rises
with wealth, until wealth w2 where it equals the ﬁrst-best eﬀort. Thereafter the LL constraint
ceases to bind. Agents with wealth above w1 do not earn any rents, while those between w and
w1 do.
184.2 Eﬀects of Changing Bankruptcy Law
The P-optimal contract is of independent interest insofar as it will be the outcome of a market
monopolized by a single principal. Conditional on continuing to receive a contract, agents with
wealth below w1 will be induced to select the same eﬀort e∗ (and incentive rent) as before, while
their payment in the unsuccessful state will rise, if bankruptcy law is weakened.8 Contracting
with such agents will be less proﬁtable for lenders; the weaker law may cause the poorest agents
to lose viability and get excluded from the credit market altogether. For those that still have
access, those below w1 will beneﬁt, while those above w1 will be unaﬀected. The converse is true
of eﬀort: it remains the same below w1 and above w2, but falls for those with intermediate wealth.
The weaker law will thus allow some redistribution of rents from the monopoly lender to agents
with wealth below w1. But it comes at the expense of a utility loss for the poorest agents that
lose access, and lower productivity amongst agents of intermediate wealth.
When principals compete, however, Proposition 2 shows that the properties of the P-optimal
contract are relevant only for the poorest borrower with access to credit. For all others, the A-
optimal contract is relevant. Holding the proﬁt rate ﬁxed at a pre-speciﬁed level, the properties of
the A-optimal contract indicate the nature of credit contracts received by intramarginal borrow-
ers. In an A-optimal contract all incentive rents remain with the agent, while the participation
constraint of the principal binds. The agent becomes the residual claimant, so maximizes ﬁrst-
best surplus, subject to a ﬁnancial viability constraint of leaving lenders with a prespeciﬁed proﬁt
target. For wealthy borrowers, the ﬁrst-best eﬀort is ﬁnancially viable, and is chosen by them.
For poorer borrowers, the ﬁrst-best eﬀort is not viable. In that case they select the highest eﬀort
which is viable, given by the function ˜ e. Figure 2 shows this. The ﬁnancial viability constraint is
represented by the requirement that the inverse-U shaped curve representing the function S(e,w)
(which is maximized at e∗) lies above Lα +πalpha. This reduces to selecting eﬀorts in an interval
the highest value of which is given by ˜ e(w) for an agent with wealth w. The ﬁnancial constraint
is less binding for wealthier agents since they can post more collateral. Hence wealthier agents
choose higher eﬀort.
8In this paragraph we omit the qualiﬁcations resulting from the fact that the thresholds w1 and w2 themselves
depend on α. Accordingly, the statements apply to borrowers whose wealth is not close enough to these thresholds
that they switch their position relative to the threshold.
19In the case of an A-optimal contract relative to a given proﬁt target, a weaker bankruptcy
law causes Lα to rise, making the ﬁnancial viability constraint more stringent. This causes a loss
in their expected utility and eﬀort levels (unless they are wealthy enough to not be constrained
in the ﬁrst place). The partial equilibrium eﬀect of a weaker bankruptcy law (i.e., when lender
proﬁts are held ﬁxed) is then a Pareto-inferior outcome: the only eﬀect is a weaker precommitment
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Figure 2: Eﬀort in A-Optimal Contract For Agents with Varying Wealth
Now turn to the general equilibrium implications of varying α in the setting where principals
compete. We use Proposition 2 to derive the change in the equilibrium proﬁt rate. In what follows,
we shall make explicit the dependence of the (chosen) stable allocation on α. Speciﬁcally, there
are n(α) viable agents, where an increase in α means bankruptcy law is strengthened, enlarging
the set of viable agents, so n(α) is a nondecreasing function. The set of active agents will be
min{m,n(α)}, also nondecreasing in α. We focus on stable allocations in which the entire surplus





πP(wm;α), if m ≤ n(α);
0, if m>n (α).
(4)
Proposition 4 Suppose that bankruptcy law becomes weaker, i.e., α falls from ¯ α to α.
(A) The set of active agents either decreases or remains the same.
(B) Principals earn the same or lower proﬁt.
(C) If principals earn zero proﬁt with the stronger bankruptcy law, then each agent is either
made worse oﬀ or is left unaﬀected.
(D) For any agent active before and after the change, eﬀort decreases or remains the same.
(E) Suppose m ≤ n(α), i.e. the same number of agents are active both at ¯ α and α. Then the
marginal agent (with wm) is either better oﬀ or unaﬀected.
(F) The utility change of all agents with higher wealth than wm is greater than the utility change
of the marginal agent with wm.
Proof. (A) This is true due to the construction of n(α).
(B) Take any ¯ α>α . It has to be shown that π(α) ≤ π(¯ α). If π(α) = 0 this is obvious. If
π(α) > 0 then it must be the case that π(α)=πP(wm;α) > 0. Then, π(¯ α)=πP(wm;¯ α) ≥
πP(wm;α)=π(α), because n(¯ α) ≥ n(α) ≥ m.
(C) From π(¯ α) = 0 it follows that π(α)=0 .A sα goes from ¯ α to α, some agents active at ¯ α
may become inactive at α and these agents cannot beneﬁt.
Next, consider agents who are active both at ¯ α and α. They get an A-optimal payoﬀ relative
to π = 0 in both cases, and a lower α cannot make this any higher.
(D) First note that for any w, Lα + πP(w;α) cannot decrease as α goes from ¯ α to α.I fLα
increases by   the principal has the option of raising vs and vf equally by   while leaving eﬀort
unchanged, so in the P-optimal problem the fall in the proﬁt πP(w;α) is bounded above by  .
Second, recall from lemma 3 that the A-optimal contract for any agent involves setting eA
α =
min{eFB;˜ e(π(α);Lα;w)}. Also recall from Proposition 2 and assumption (4) that π(α) equals
21the P-optimal proﬁt with the poorest active agent. Hence if m ≤ n(α), then π(α)=πP(wm;α)
and Lα+π(α) cannot decrease as α falls. Therefore, ˜ e(π(α);Lα;w) cannot increase for any active
agent (since at the largest solution to (3) e · (Ss − Sf) − e · D (e) is decreasing in e).
If m>n (¯ α) then π(¯ α)=π(α)=0 ,Lα +π(α) is higher at α and the same argument as above
applies.
If n(¯ α) >m>n (α) then π¯ α ≤ Lα − L¯ α because the agent who was viable at ¯ α is no longer
viable at α. This implies that π¯ α + L¯ α ≤ Lα + πα = Lα. Otherwise, if π¯ α >L α − L¯ α then the
principal could pay Lα −L¯ α more in both states of the world to the agent and still earn a proﬁt,
so the agent would be viable at α.
(E) An agent with wm gets the P-optimal contract corresponding to his wealth wm and α
(which is the A-optimal contract corresponding to πP(wm)). We know from above that this
agent’s eﬀort is the same or lower.
Let e∗ = argmax e·(s−f)−e·D (e). If e ≥ e∗ both before and after the change, the agent’s
utility will be w+S(R), and thus remain unaﬀected. If e¯ α ≥ e∗ = eα, the participation constraint
is non-binding and the agent earns positive rents at α, while the participation constraint is binding
at ¯ α, then the agent is strictly better oﬀ in the former situation.
(F) Take any two wealth levels w  and w   with w  >w   . The agent’s beneﬁt from the change
to the weak bankruptcy law is non-decreasing in wealth:
U(α,w  ) − U(¯ α,w ) ≥ U(¯ α,w  ) − U(α,w   ) (5)
⇔ (eA
¯ α(w ) − eA
α(w ))(Ss − Sf) − (D(eA
¯ α(w )) − D(eA
α(w ))) ≤ (6)
(eA
¯ α(w  ) − eA
α(w  ))(Ss − Sf) − (D(eA
¯ α(w  )) − D(eA
α(w  )))
where eA
α(w) denotes the eﬀort in the A-optimal contract for agent with wealth w with bankruptcy
law α.
Since eﬀort is nondecreasing in wealth, eA
α(w ) ≥ eA
α(w  ) with the strong inequality as long
as eA
α(w  )  = eFB. Using this information and the fact that e · (Ss − Sf) − D(e) is concave, it
follows that U(α,w  ) − U(¯ α,w ) ≥ U(α,w   ) − U(¯ α,w  ) if the change in eﬀort is greater for the
poorer agent: (eA
¯ α(w ) − eA
α(w )) ≤ (eA
¯ α(w  ) − eA
α(w  )).
We claim this is indeed the case. Recall that eA
α(w) = min{˜ e(π(α);Lα;w);eFB}, where ˜ e(·)i s
22the largest solution for e in equation 3. Note that the left-hand-side of this equation is concave
in e; so it has two solutions, and is downward sloping at the larger solution, with a slope that
is steeper the larger ˜ e is (refer to Figure 2). The wealthier agent selects the higher eﬀort, so
the slope is steeper there. Since the increase in the right hand side of the equation, Lα + π(α),
is common to all agents, the required cutback in eﬀort is greater for the poorer agent. This is
evident if eA
¯ α(w  ) <e FB. It is also true if eA
¯ α(w  )=eFB, for then eA
¯ α(w )=eFB also, and we get
(eA
¯ α(w ) − eA
α(w )) ≤ (eA
¯ α(w  ) − eA
α(w  )) (7)
⇔ eA
α(w  )) ≤ eA
α(w )) (8)
which is true because w  >w   .
Corollary 5 Suppose proﬁts are positive both before and after the weakening of bankruptcy law.
Then all agents are weakly better oﬀ, while principals are worse oﬀ.
Weakening the bankruptcy law may lead to the exclusion of some active agents, as those
agents may now cease to be viable. If the principals are on the short side of the market, so
proﬁts are positive to start with, the proﬁt of the principals will decrease (as long as the poorest
borrower is credit-constrained in the sense that the eﬀort is less than ﬁrst-best).
If proﬁts decline, there is a positive general equilibrium eﬀect on the welfares of intramarginal
active agents. This runs against the direct negative eﬀect of weaker commitment ability of these
agents. The net eﬀect can go either way.
This is illustrated by considering two polar cases. The ﬁrst is where the principals are on the
long side of the market, so proﬁts are zero both before and after the change in the bankruptcy
law. Then only the direct eﬀect operates, and no agent can beneﬁt. Some agents will cease to be
active, as they are no longer viable. They are rendered worse oﬀ if they were previously obtaining
positive rents. Other intramarginal agents who continue to be active are also left worse oﬀ as
long as their wealth is low enough that the limited liability constraint is binding. Their weaker
ability to commit limits their access to credit.
The other polar case is where the principals are on the short side of the market and proﬁts
are positive both before and after the change. In this case, the welfare impacts on the agents





















Figure 3: Eﬀects Of Weakening Bankruptcy Rule When Set of Active Agents is Unaﬀected
the weakening of bankruptcy law. The general equilibrium eﬀect of lowered proﬁt outweighs the
direct negative eﬀect of weaker commitment ability of agents. Figure 3 depicts this situation.
In intermediate cases, depicted in Figure 4, the proﬁt rate is positive with the strong
bankruptcy law, but drops to zero with the weaker law. In this case some active agents are
excluded from the market: these agents may be worse oﬀ. Wealthier intra-marginal agents may
be better oﬀ, owing to the general equilibrium eﬀect. In general, as part (F) of the result shows,
the wealthier agents beneﬁt more from the weakening of bankruptcy law, essentially because
the negative direct eﬀect resulting from the aggravation of the limited liability constraint is less
acute for them. Hence a weaker bankruptcy law results in a redistribution from poorer agents and
principals to agents of intermediate wealth (who are not wealthy enough to self-ﬁnance, yet are
wealthy enough to not be aﬀected substantially by the weaker precommitment ability). Weaker
bankruptcy law can be understood as a redistribution in favor of middle class borrowers against
the poor as well as lenders.






















Figure 4: Eﬀects Of Weakening Bankruptcy Rule When Set Of Active Agents Shrinks
25could also go either way. The direct eﬀect would tend to reduce eﬀort, while the indirect eﬀect
which transfers rents from principals to agents would tend to raise eﬀort (as it is akin to an increase
in the agent’s wealth). Yet, it turns out that the net eﬀect on eﬀort can never be positive. In
contrast to the impact on agent welfare levels, the direct negative eﬀect always outweighs the
indirect positive eﬀect on eﬀort of each active agent.
The preceding statements pertain, however, to the situation where there is an across-the-
board reduction in α, applicable to all borrowers. Consider instead a selective weakening of the
law, applicable only to those with wealth below some threshold.
Proposition 6 Suppose to start with there is a constant α that applies to all wealth levels,
followed by a selective lowering of α for all borrowers below some threshold w∗ at which borrowers
initially had access to credit and for whom the LL constraint was binding. If the equilibrium proﬁt
rate was initially positive, borrowers wealthier than w∗ become better oﬀ, their eﬀort cannot
decrease, and increases strictly for all those with eﬀort below eFB to start with.
The eﬀects of the relaxation of the liability rule selectively for poor borrowers are somewhat
paradoxical: such a seemingly pro-poor reform may end up hurting the poor (by causing many of
them to be excluded from the market), but they do beneﬁt the wealthier borrowers not covered
by the reform. For the latter are exempted from the harmful partial equilibrium eﬀect of lower
commitment, and can only beneﬁt from the general equilibrium eﬀect. The latter will arise as
long as the law is weakened for borrowers poor enough that the liability limits are binding, and
equilibrium proﬁts were positive to start with. A key diﬀerence from the case of an across-the-
board reduction in α is that the productivity eﬀects are now positive for wealthy borrowers.
This result provides a rationale for selective access of poor borrowers to Chapter 7 rules in the
US: they can be viewed as a form of redistribution from lenders (and maybe poor borrowers) to
middle-class borrowers. If the wealth distribution is concentrated on the middle, such forms of
redistribution can promote eﬃciency besides being politically popular.
However, the reform that occurred in March 2005 in the US limited access to Chapter 7 ﬁlings
for borrowers with wealth above a threshold, so was the exact opposite of the reform described
in Proposition 6. In the case of a selective strengthening of bankruptcy law above a threshold,
there will be no general equilibrium eﬀects (assuming those below the threshold continue to retain
access to credit). Only the partial equilibrium eﬀects will appear, and according to our model
26their eﬀect is described by an increase in α on A-optimal contracts with a ﬁxed proﬁt rate. This
results in an ex ante Pareto improvement with gains accruing (only) to wealthier borrowers owing
to their improved commitment ability.
5 Bonded labor
In this section we consider the eﬀects of bonded labor. As explained previously, we assume
that there is strong enforcement of contracts — borrowers are not given any leeway to deviate
from terms of the original contract, either with respect to ﬁnancial transfers or bonded labor.
Financial transfers are assumed to be costlessly enforced, while bonded labor services l entail some
deadweight enforcement cost q(l), besides possible ex post ineﬃciency if labor market returns are
low compared with the agent’s eﬀort disutility. Consequently eﬃcient contracts will use bonded
labor only after exhausting the scope for ﬁnancial transfers, i.e., li > 0 only if ti = yi + w − IA.
Given this property, there is no scope for a contract with bonded labor to be renegotiated.
Lowering the extent of bonded labor to be provided by the latter cannot be accompanied by a
supplementary ﬁnancial transfer to the lender, as the borrower has no funds left. Hence bonded
labor may arise in equilibrium despite the attendant deadweight costs. This is in contrast with
bankruptcy, which did not actually occur in equilibrium.
We now introduce the notation used to analyse bonded labor contracts. Legally, a contract
{ti,l i}i=s,f speciﬁes transfer payments ti and an amount of labor li the agent has to work for
the principal in each state i. Contracts are restricted to satisfy the constraints ti ≤ yi + w − IA,
with equality holding if li > 0. Given any such contract, an agent will oﬀer supplementary labor
ˆ li on the spot market, which solves the problem of maximizing Rl − g(li + l) with respect to
choice of l ≥ 0. Let the maximized payoﬀ attained Rˆ li − g(li + ˆ li) be denoted by −G(li). G
can then be interpreted as a net cost to the borrower associated with bonded labor obligation
li, after incorporating supplemental earnings from the spot market. If M(R) ≥ 0 denotes the
maximum value of R.l−g(l) with respect to l ≥ 0, it is clear that −G(0) ≡ M(R) and G(li)i sa n
increasing function of li. In particular it increases at a constant rate of R upto li = ˆ l(0,R) where
the marginal disutility g (li) equals R. Over this range the agent supplies an ex post eﬃcient level












Figure 5: Net Costs Of Bonded Labor
labor one-for-one. For bonded labor obligation exceeding the ex post eﬃcient level, the agent will
supply no additional labor to the spot market; G will coincide with the labor supply disutility
function g from that point onwards. See Figure 5.
The payoﬀ of the borrower in state i (net of ex ante eﬀort cost) will then be vi ≡ yi+w−IA−
ti − G(li). Using state contingent payoﬀs to denote the contract, the ﬁnancial transfer ti equals
yi + w − IA − vi − G(li). In addition to this, the lender receives from the bonded labor services
worth x(li) ≡ R.li − q(li), owing to need to expend q(li) resources to enforce the bonded labor
obligation. We assume that q (li) ∈ (0,R) for all li, implying that x is an increasing function,
i.e., that the marginal enforcement costs q  are always positive but lie below the return to labor
supply R. So increasing bonded labor in any state raises the returns to the principal.
It is also convenient to replace the bonded labor requirement li by its net cost to the borrower
G(li). Since G(.) is strictly increasing, it is an invertible function, and we can express the net
return to the lender as a function of the state-contingent cost Gi of bonded labor to the borrower:
r(Gi) ≡ x(G−1(Gi)) ≡ RG−1(Gi) − q(G−1(Gi). Since G is also convex, r is a strictly increasing,
concave function, with a slope everywhere strictly less than R, owing to the existence of positive
marginal costs of enforcing bonded labor obligations.
The net deadweight cost of a bonded labor obligation that costs Gi to the borrower is then
given by the function Q(Gi) ≡ Gi − r(Gi) deﬁned over Gi ≥− M(R). Q(.) is convex owing to
28the concavity of r(.). It is also easily checked that this is a strictly increasing function, with a
slope between 0 and 1.9 In what follows, we shall impose an upper bound on the convexity of




Q (G) · (1 − Q (G))
D  (1) + D (1)
for all G ≥− M(R) (9)
In other words, the marginal deadweight costs of bonded labor should not be increasing at too
fast a rate. In particular, it requires that the marginal disutility of eﬀort D  and its rate of increase
D   be bounded. The role of this assumption will be explained in due course.
Using ({vi,G i}i=s,f,e) to denote a bonded labor contract, we can express the net payoﬀ to
the lender in state i as ti + r(Gi) − (I − IA) ≡ yi +( w − IA) − vi − Gi + r(Gi) − (I − IA) ≡
w−I+yi−vi−Q(Gi). So the expected proﬁt of the lender is π = w−I+e·(ys−yf)+yf −e(vs+
Q(Gs))−(1−e)·(vf+Q(Gf)), while expected utility of the borrower is V = e·vs+(1−e)·vf−D(e).
Moreover, the liquidity constraint on ﬁnancial transfers ti ≤ yi + w − IA is equivalent to the
constraint that vi ≡ yi +w −IA −ti −Gi ≥− G(li). Therefore a feasible contract is described by
the following constraints:10
LL : vs ≥− Gs, vf ≥− Gf, with Gi ≥− M(R),i= s,f (10)
IC : vs − vf = D (e) (11)
PPC : π ≡ w − I + e · (ys − yf)+yf − e(vs + Q(Gs)) − (1 − e) · (vf + Q(Gf)) ≥ 0 (12)
APC : V ≡ evs +( 1− e)vf − D(e) ≥ w + M(R) (13)
Intuitively, the potential value of bonded labor is that it helps relax the liability limit of the
agent, and permits the lender to extract more resources than would be permitted by the agent’s
project returns and net personal wealth. However, this is subject to a deadweight enforcement
cost Q. The optimal design of a bonded labor contract will have to trade oﬀ the beneﬁt of relaxing
liability limits on the agent with their corresponding deadweight losses.
In the intermediate regime where bonded labor is banned, the additional restriction that
Gf = Gs = −M(R) applies. Here the ﬂexibility to adjust the liability limit is no longer available.
9Since q is strictly increasing, x(li) has a slope less than R. Moreover, G  is never less than R, so the slope of
G−1 is bounded above by 1
R. Therefore r(Gi) which is a composition of these two increasing functions, is rising
at a rate less than 1. Hence Q(G) ≡ G − r(G) is a strictly increasing function, with a slope less than 1.
10The agent’s participation constraint reﬂects the net payoﬀ in the event of not participating in a project, the
sum of ex ante wealth w and subsequent labor market opportunities M(R).
29In what follows we shall assume that the ex ante wealth w of the agent is nonnegative. This
seems fairly innocuous, though relaxing it may allow additional ﬂexibility to agents in a dynamic
setting whereby they may be allowed to carry their debts forward into the future.
The constraints above characterize the set of feasible bonded labor contracts. We can deﬁne
a contract to be P-optimal if it maximizes π over the feasible set, and a contract to be A-optimal
relative to proﬁt target π∗ if it maximizes the agent’s expected utility over the subset of feasible
contracts that generate expected proﬁt of at least π∗. Finally a contract is said to be Pareto
optimal if there does not exist another which makes either the principal or agent better oﬀ,
without making the other worse oﬀ.
We start by noting some important qualitative features of optimal contracts.
Lemma 7 (i) In any Pareto optimal contract, bonded labor does not arise in state s, and the
LL constraint binds if at all in state f.
(ii) APC binds in a P-optimal contract.
(iii) In an A-optimal contract relative to π∗, bonded labor is used in state f for an agent with
wealth w if and only if the associated eﬀort e satisﬁes
S(e;w) ≡ w − I + e(ys − yf)+yf − eD (e) <π ∗ + M(R). (14)
If (14) holds, Gf > −M(R) is the unique solution for G in the equation
G − (1 − e)Q(G)=π∗ − S(e;w). (15)
Otherwise Gf = Gs = −M(R) and bonded labor is not required in either state.
Bonded labor is used, if at all, only when the project fails. If they are also being used in the
successful state, it implies that maximal use of ﬁnancial transfers are not being made in that state.
To provide eﬀort incentives the agent must be better oﬀ in the successful state, which requires
the agent be left with some ﬁnancial surplus in that state. A Pareto improving change in the
contract is then possible, by lowering bonded labor and raising ﬁnancial transfers. Property (ii)
says that the ability to impose bonded labor without any restriction allows a monopolist principal
to fully expropriate the agent. It allows relaxation of the liability restriction on the agent in the
30unsuccessful state that would arise in the absence of bonded labor. Though this restriction comes
at the expense of some deadweight enforcement costs, it is nonetheless proﬁtable for the principal
to enforce them. Property (iii) describes when bonded labor would be used in an A-optimal
contract in order to implement a given eﬀort level: this happens if the surplus left available after
paying the agent incentive rents necessary to implement the given eﬀort level is insuﬃcient to
cover the proﬁt target of the principal (besides the spot labor market rents the agent would earn
in the event of non-participation).
The set of eﬀort levels that would necessitate the use of bonded labor in an A-optimal contract
can be seen in Figure 2. For a given wealth level, the surplus function S(e,w) is concave in eﬀort,
with an interior maximum at e∗. The set of eﬀort levels that can be implemented without bonded
labor thus constitutes an interval, with a maximum at ˜ e(w;π∗). Implementation of eﬀort levels
higher than this would necessitate bonded labor. A higher level of wealth w raises the surplus
function. This suggests that bonded labor will tend to be used for poorer agents, controlling for
the eﬀort level. However, the eﬀort level is endogenously determined, an issue we turn to next.
5.1 Choice of Eﬀort in A-Optimal Contracts
Let K(e;π∗;w) denote the optimal choice of Gf to implement eﬀort e for an agent of wealth w in
an A-optimal contract relative to proﬁt target π∗, as described in Lemma 7. The corresponding
choice of vf is then vf = S(e,w)−(1−e)·Q(K(e;π∗;w))−π∗, yielding the following expression
for the expected utility of the agent as a function of the eﬀort level alone:
V ≡ vf + α(e)=S(e,w) − (1 − e) · Q(K(e;π∗;w)) − π∗ + α(e) (16)
= F(e,w) − (1 − e) · Q(K(e,π∗,w)) − π∗ (17)
where F(e;w)=w − I + e · (ys − yf)+yf − D(e) is the ﬁrst-best surplus function. Expression
(17) says that the second-best surplus accruing to the agent is simply the ﬁrst-best surplus, less
the amount π∗ that has to be transferred to the principal, and the expected deadweight loss
(1 − e) · Q(K(e,π∗,w)) of bonded labor.
(17) implies that for agents wealthy enough that the ﬁrst-best eﬀort eFB is implementable
without bonded labor, the optimal eﬀort is indeed the ﬁrst-best level. For all others, implemen-
tation of the ﬁrst-best eﬀort necessitates bonded labor. For such agents the marginal deadweight
31loss of bonded labor needs to be incorporated in deriving the second-best solution. Note that the
expected deadweight loss (1−e)Q(K(e,w,π∗)) is nonconvex in e. In particular it is possible that
the marginal deadweight loss with respect to higher eﬀort is negative at suﬃciently high eﬀort
levels, while it is positive at lower levels, since
Ce = −Q(K(e,π∗,w) )+( 1− e) · Q (K(e,π∗,w)) · Ke. (18)
Since bonded labor is eﬀected only in the unsuccessful state, increasing the eﬀort implies a lower
chance of having to be in such a state in the ﬁrst place. Counterbalancing this is the higher level
of bonded labor required, in the event that the project is unsuccessful. If the unsuccessful state is
suﬃciently unlikely in the ﬁrst place, the ﬁrst eﬀect could dominate the second. It is diﬃcult to
rule out the possibility that increasing the agent’s eﬀort beyond some point actually reduces the
expected cost of bonded labor. Indeed, for this reason we cannot guarantee that the second-best
eﬀort lies below the ﬁrst-best level.
Nevertheless, what we need for our purposes is a comparative static property of how second-
best eﬀort varies with agent wealth, and this can indeed be shown as a result of the assumption
(9) bounding the curvature of deadweight loss function. We show that the bonded labor cost
satisﬁes a single-crossing property with respect to wealth: marginal deadweight costs of raising
eﬀort are higher for wealthier agents:









The role of assumption (9) can be explained as follows. Given any desired eﬀort level, the
extent of bonded labor required to implement it is higher, the poorer the agent. Increasing the
eﬀort level reduces the probability of the unsuccessful state, i.e., the likelihood of having to
implement bonded labor. This is a beneﬁt of raising the eﬀort level, which is greater for poorer
agents since they involve more bonded labor.
Countering this eﬀect is the fact that higher eﬀort necessitates more bonded labor. The
convexity of the deadweight loss function implies this eﬀect is also stronger for poorer agents,
32since they have a higher level of bonded labor to start with. Assumption (9) restricts the strength
of the second eﬀect, allowing the previous eﬀect to dominate.
We are now in a position to prove that poorer agents select higher eﬀort and more bonded
labor. Moreover poorer agents derive a greater beneﬁt from the use of bonded labor.
Proposition 9 Consider any A-optimal contract relative to a given proﬁt target π∗.
(i) There exists a ¯ w s.t. all agents with w<¯ w select bonded labor and all w>¯ w do not select
bonded labor.
(ii) Eﬀort is decreasing in wealth among agents with w<¯ w, nondecreasing among richer agents,
and strictly increasing whenever their eﬀort is less than the ﬁrst-best level.
(iii) Poorer agents derive greater ex ante beneﬁt from the use of bonded labor than wealthier
agents.
Proof. We start by proving (iii), amongst the set of agents that select positive bonded labor. Pick
an interval in which all agents select bonded labor. Lemma 8 implies that poorer agents within
this interval will select a higher eﬀort. Consider wealths w6,w 7 with w7 <w 6 in this interval.
Then
e(w7,π∗) >e (w6,π∗) > ˜ e(w6,π∗) > ˜ e(w7,π∗), (20)
where e(w,π∗) is the eﬀort chosen by an agent with wealth w if bonded labor is allowed. See
Figure 6. If bonded labor is not allowed, then it is easily checked that the optimal eﬀort will be
˜ e(w,π∗), since this is the largest eﬀort below the ﬁrst-best eﬀort that is implementable without
bonded labor.
We claim that the increased utility achievable from use of bonded labor is greater for the poorer
agent w7. For this agent, bonded labor permits eﬀort to increase from ˜ e(w7,π∗)t oe(w7,π∗). Using
inequality (20) it follows that we can break up this change into the sum of three changes: (a)
an increase from ˜ e(w7,π∗)t o˜ e(w6,π∗), (b) increase from ˜ e(w6,π∗)t oe(w6,π∗), and (c) increase
from e(w6,π∗)t oe(w7,π∗). For the richer agent with wealth w6, (b) represents the only change.
Over the change in eﬀort represented in (b), the poorer agent attains a higher utility increase,
owing to Lemma 8. Adding to this the eﬀect of changes (a) and (c) which arise only for the agent
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Figure 6: Eﬀort With And Without Bonded Labor For Given Proﬁt Rate
Now turn to (i). If this is false, there exist wealth levels w,w  and w   with w   >w   >w
where agents with wealth w and w   select positive bonded labor and w  does not. So we can ﬁnd
wealth levels w1,w 2,w 3,w 4 with w1 <w<w 2 <w   <w 3 <w    <w 4 such that agents with
wealth in (w1,w 2) select bonded labor, agents with wealth in (w2,w 3) do not, and agents with











Since the envelope theorem applies, the indirect utility of agents is continuous in w, with and
without the use of bonded labor. Hence the utility gain from use of bonded labor must also vary
continuously with w. Remember that all w  ∈ (w2,w 3) do not select bonded labor. Taking limits
as w  → w3− it follows that w3 derives no beneﬁt from bonded labor. On the other hand, all
w ∈ (w3,w 4) derive a positive beneﬁt from bonded labor. Moreover, we have shown above that
the poorer among them obtain a higher beneﬁt. So then taking limits as w  approaches w3 from
the right, the beneﬁt from bonded labor must be strictly positive. This contradicts the continuity
of the beneﬁts in w at w3.
(iii) now follows for the set of all agents, since those above ¯ w do not derive any beneﬁt from
bonded labor, while the argument provided above applies to all agents below ¯ w. Finally, (ii)
follows from combining (iii) and (i).
Consider now the eﬀect of a ban on bonded labor. We represent the equilibrium resulting
within any legal regime by the stable allocation in the game where principals and agents are
matched. The characterization of stable allocations is exactly analogous to that provided for
the bankruptcy law regimes. As before, we assume that all the surplus with the marginal agent
accrues to the corresponding principal.
Proposition 10 If bonded labor were to be banned, the eﬀects on the equilibrium in a stable
35allocation would be the following.
(i) The number of active agents will either decrease or remain unchanged.
(ii) The equilibrium proﬁt π earned by the principals will either decrease or remain unchanged.
(iii) If the number of active agents is unchanged, the utility of the marginal included agent will
either increase or remain unchanged.
(iv) If fewer agents are active, the marginal excluded agent is left the same, while the expected
utility of intramarginal excluded agents either decreases or is unchanged.
(v) Suppose an agent who remains active both with and without a ban on bonded labor, and
is wealthy enough that he would not use bonded labor even when it is allowed. This agent
cannot be rendered worse oﬀ with the ban, and beneﬁts from it if and only if equilibrium
proﬁt π decreases. In the latter case, the agent’s eﬀort increases as a result of the ban (if it
is less than ﬁrst-best to start with), and is otherwise unaﬀected.
(vi) Consider poorer agents who are active both with and without a ban, who use bonded labor
when allowed. If the proﬁt rate falls, eﬀort increases for the richest of these agents and is
reduced for the poorest of these agents.
Proof. (i) follows from the fact that the set of viable agents shrinks or is unaﬀected by a ban,
and (ii) from the fact that the equilibrium proﬁt (if positive) is determined by the P-optimal
contract with the marginal agent. A ban on bonded labor must cause this proﬁt to decline if
bonded labor is used with the marginal agent when allowed, and otherwise remains unaﬀected.
For (iii), if the number of active agents is unaﬀected then the marginal agent cannot be worse
oﬀ with a ban, because with bonded labor part (ii) of Lemma 7 implies that the agent earns no
rents, i.e., obtains his outside option exactly. So this agent cannot be worse oﬀ with a ban. Part
(iv) follows from the fact that exclusion results in agents earning their outside options, whereas
inclusion implies they attain at least their outside option, so they cannot be rendered better oﬀ
by being excluded.
For any agent who does not use bonded labor when allowed, the only eﬀect of the ban operates
via the change in the proﬁt. There is a change in utility and eﬀort only if the proﬁt declines, in
36which case both eﬀects are positive (unless the agent is already at the ﬁrst-bet eﬀort, in which
case only utility will rise). This establishes (v).
Finally for (vi), consider ﬁrst the richest class of agents with wealth in the interval ( ¯ w − , ¯ w)
for  >0 suﬃciently small, that use bonded labor when allowed. For these agents, utility and
eﬀort eﬀects are close to those for an agent with wealth ¯ w who does not use bonded labor when
allowed. From (v) it follows that the eﬀect on these agents’ utility and eﬀort must be positive
(assuming less than ﬁrst-best eﬀort). Consider alternately the poorest included agent both with
and without the ban, who uses bonded labor when allowed. This agent must be the marginal agent
when the ban is in eﬀect, and thus obtains a P-optimal contract in this context. We claim that
the corresponding eﬀort e must lie below his eﬀort e  when bonded labor is allowed. Otherwise,
suppose e ≥ e . Note that this agent receives an A-optimal contract when bonded labor is allowed,
hence e  is at least as large as e  , the eﬀort in the P-optimal contract for this agent when bonded
labor is allowed. It would then follow that e ≥ e  , i.e., the eﬀort in the P-optimal contract for
this agent is not lowered when bonded labor is banned.
We now show this cannot happen in a P-optimal contract which uses bonded labor. When
bonded labor is allowed, a P-optimal contract for an agent with wealth w maximizes S(e,w)−vf−
(1−e)Q(Gf) subject to vf ≥− Gf,G f ≥− M(R),v f +α(e) ≥ w+M(R). By Lemma 7 the APC
must bind, so vf = w+M(R)−α(e). The LL constraint then reduces to w+M(R)−α(e) ≥− Gf.
So Gf will be set equal to α(e)−w−M(R), and the P-optimal problem reduces to maximization of
F(e,0)−(1−e)Q(α(e)−w−M(R)) with respect to e alone. Note that bonded labor is used if and
only if α(e) >w , and the expected cost of bonded labor Z(e;w) ≡ (1 − e)Q(α(e) − w − M(R))
satisﬁes ∂
2Z
∂e∂w = Q (α(e) − w − M(R)) − (1 − e)Q  (α(e) − w − M(R))α (e) > 0 by virtue of
assumption (9). So eﬀort in the P-optimal contract must be decreasing in w over the range where
bonded labor is used. On the other hand, when bonded labor is banned, eﬀort in the P-optimal
contract is nondecreasing in w. Combining these two facts, it follows that the P-optimal eﬀort
must be higher for an agent using bonded labor, compared with P-optimal eﬀort for this agent
when bonded labor cannot be used.
The welfare eﬀects of the ban are shown in Figures 7 and 8, for the two cases respectively
where there is and is not a reduction in the number of active agents (and the equilibrium proﬁt

























Figure 7: Eﬀects of Banning Bonded Labor When Set of Active Agents Shrinks
between w1 and w2 are included when bonded labor is allowed but excluded when it is banned.
The marginal agent w1 when bonded labor is permitted is equally well oﬀ, but intramarginal
agents between w1 and w2 earn some rents when bonded labor is used, so they are worse oﬀ
being excluded as a result of the ban. Agents between w2 and w3 are included in both situations,
and use bonded labor when permitted. The poorest among them must be worse oﬀ, while the
richest among them must be better oﬀ. Those richer than w3 do not use bonded labor when it is
permitted, so are not directly aﬀected by the ban. Hence they must beneﬁt from the lower proﬁt
rate.
The upper panel of Figure 7 shows the corresponding change in eﬀort levels for the set of
38included agents. Those above w3 must choose a higher eﬀort following the ban, as long as it was
less than ﬁrst-best to start with. Since they do not use bonded labor when it is allowed, the
ban does not aﬀect them directly (i.e., except through a change in the equilibrium proﬁt rate).
The reduced proﬁt rate redistributes rents to these agents, resulting in higher eﬀort. This is an
important contrast with the eﬀects of a weaker (linear) bankruptcy rule, where wealthier agents
may be rendered better oﬀ owing to the general equilibrium eﬀect, but their eﬀort decreases. In
that context the bankruptcy constraint is binding for any agent with less than ﬁrst-best eﬀort.
Hence the the weakening of the bankruptcy rule has a direct adverse productivity eﬀect, that
eventually outweighs the beneﬁt of a lower proﬁt rate. In the bonded labor context, wealthy
borrowers do not themselves use any bonded labor, so there is no direct partial equilibrium
eﬀect adversely impacting on their eﬀorts and payoﬀs. It is similar to a selective weakening of
bankruptcy for borrowers below some threshold, as described in Proposition 6.
Amongst agents between w2 and w3, eﬀort rises for those near w3, and falls for those near w2.
These agents use bonded labor when permitted, so there is a direct adverse eﬀect of disallowing
bonded labor which oﬀsets the beneﬁt from a lower proﬁt rate. The richer amongst these agents
obtain a smaller beneﬁt from bonded labor so for them the proﬁt eﬀect dominates, while the
opposite is true for the poorer ones.
Figure 8 shows the productivity and welfare impacts when the ban leaves the set of active
agents unaﬀected. The marginal agent with wealth w1 may beneﬁt from the ban, as he receives a
P-optimal contract in both situations. The ban limits the principal’s capacity to extract incentive
rents from this agent: if w1 is smaller than α−1(e∗) (where it may be recalled e∗ maximizes S(e;0))
then the marginal agent will earn positive rents in the absence of bonded labor, and thus rendered
better oﬀ with a ban. Also, agents with wealth above w4 who do not use bonded labor even when
it is permitted, will beneﬁt from the ban. For those in between, i.e., intramarginal agents who
do use bonded labor when permitted, may or may not beneﬁt from the ban.11 Eﬀort rises above
w4, falls at w1 and may rise or fall in-between. The main diﬀerence from the case where the set
11If the proﬁt rate were to be unchanged then these intramarginal agents must also be better oﬀ. This is because
of the preceding result that poorer agents are more adversely aﬀected by a ban of bonded labor, for a given proﬁt
rate. A lower proﬁt rate, however, also beneﬁts poorer agents more, by an argument analogous to that used in



























Figure 8: Eﬀects Of Banning Bonded Labor When Set of Active Agents is Unaﬀected
40of active agents shrinks, is that poor agents (at or near w1) beneﬁt from the ban as long as they
manage to continue being active. In the other case they were excluded and became worse oﬀ.
6 Concluding Comments
Our results provide some rationale for a greater willingness of poorer countries to tolerate bonded
labor. If the wealth distribution is concentrated among poor borrowers who stand to lose credit
access if bonded labor were to be banned, and there are relatively few borrowers wealthy enough
to beneﬁt from a lower rate of proﬁt while not using bonded labor themselves, banning bonded
labor will hurt most borrowers as well as lenders, and is likely to reduce average productivity in
the economy.
When the economy has a larger concentration of middle class borrowers who would not use
bonded labor themselves, the beneﬁts of banning bonded labor grow. For more developed coun-
tries, thus, bonded labor may come to be banned, and replaced by bankruptcy law that provides
borrowers ex post freedom to choose how much labor services to provide after the project has
been terminated. In such countries, selective weakening of bankruptcy provisions for poor bor-
rowers may be both popular among the middle class and raise productivity, but will be resisted
by lenders. The relative political strength of the two groups may well determine the nature of
the resulting legal rules adopted.
Our model has deliberately abstracted from a number of important considerations which bear
on the design of debtor liability rules. These include possible incompleteness of contracts, limited
rationality among borrowers, or incentive problems among lenders.
The analysis may have interesting applications to other markets as well, such as rentals for
land, housing or productive assets. In the context of labor markets, analogous issues arise in
laws concerning indentured labor. Immigrant workers often enter into indentured agreements
with agents to cover the costs of moving to a new country. Allowing indentured labor tends to
increase immigrant inﬂows which lower wage rates, which hurt native workers while beneﬁting
employers. A similar general equilibrium eﬀect explains why native workers are often opposed to
such indentured contracts among immigrants, while employers favor their use.
Extensions of our model in a number of directions would be interesting. These include the
41case where borrowers are risk-averse, or where principals do not get all the surplus in their
contract with the marginal agent (instead this is replaced by a Nash bargaining solution). With
concave utility the most proﬁtable borrowers are not always the wealthiest, owing to income eﬀects
on the demand for leisure. Instead agents with intermediate wealths are the most proﬁtable
and productive (Mookherjee (1997)). Besides, the analysis of optimal contracts will have to
additionally address insurance eﬀects. Whether or how our results get modiﬁed is not obvious,
and needs further research. The case where the surplus is divided in a diﬀerent way will not
aﬀect results if the number of borrowers is large enough, so the wealth gap between the poorest
active borrower and the next poorer agent (who is excluded) is small. Even with a bigger gap, we
suspect our results will be qualitatively unaltered if we were to use a Nash bargaining solution.
Further extensions to the context of randomized contracts and joint liability loans would also
be of interest; these will involve a more signiﬁcant extension of the basic model. Another extension
might be to a context where diﬀerent principals vary in their ﬁxed costs, whence changes in the
law will aﬀect the extent of concentration on the lender side.
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43Appendix: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 We begin with the following properties of A-optimal con-
tracts.
Lemma 11 An agent’s utility U(π) in an A-optimal contract is strictly decreasing in π.
Proof. Suppose this were not true and U(π)=U(π ) with π>π  . Then, the participation
constraint for the principal is not binding at π , which is not possible in an A-optimal contract
because vs and vf could be increased uniformly without disturbing e or any of the constraints.
Lemma 12 Fix any π ≤ πP(w). If there exists a feasible contract where the principal gets π and
the agent gets UA <U(π) then there exists a feasible Pareto improving contract.
Proof. Deﬁne payoﬀs of the agent with wealth w and payoﬀ in the P-optimal contract for this
agent as follows: U∗ = e∗ ·D (e∗)−D(e∗) and π∗ = e∗ ·(Ss −Sf)+Sf −Lα −e∗ ·D (e∗)+w−I,
where Lα denotes (1 − α) · R · l∗(α,R) − g(l∗(α,R)).
Now consider the problem of maximizing the principal’s payoﬀ over the set of feasible contracts
for agent with wealth w, subject to the additional constraint that the agent attain at least UA.
π(UA) ≡ max
C∈Γ
π s.t.: e · vs +( 1− e) · vf − D(e) ≥ UA.
We ﬁrst argue that the hypothesis that there exists a feasible contract where the principal
gets π and the agent less than U(π) implies that π must be strictly less than π∗. At the P-optimal
contract, standard arguments imply that the agents PC is not binding, and the LL constraint must
be binding, with vf = Lα. There cannot exist any contract satisfying the IC and LL constraints
where the agent gets less than U∗, while the principal gets π∗. This can be seen from the fact
that with vs−vf = D (e∗) and vf = Lα, a decrease in the agent’s utility can only be achieved by
reducing vs which also reduces the principal’s proﬁts. Therefore, there does not exist a feasible
contract which gives the principal π∗ and the agent less than U∗ ≡ U(π∗).
Hence it must be the case that the agent’s PC is binding, and π<π ∗. The former fact implies
that over this range, π(UA) is strictly decreasing locally. Hence UA <U (π) implies π(UA) >π .
Starting with the contract giving the principal π(UA), we can raise vs and vf uniformly by a small
44amount which leaves eﬀort unchanged, which gives the agent a utility slightly above UA and the
principal a proﬁt slightly below π(UA). Then the agent gets more than UA and the principal also
more than π, so this contract Pareto-dominates the original one.
This property guarantees that agents who do not receive the A-optimal contract are able to
transfer utility to the principal and therefore achieve a Pareto improvement by moving to an
A-optimal contract.
Now return to the proof of the Proposition. We show ﬁrst that stable allocations always exist,
by explicitly constructing one. Take any π satisfying (2). Select the Q-richest agents, match
them each with a principal, and select an A-optimal contract subject to the constraint that the
principal get at least π. Since each selected agent i is at least as rich as the Q-th agent, we have
π ≤ πP(wi); hence such a contract exists for each selected agent.
We claim that this allocation is stable. Note ﬁrst that no pair already matched can ﬁnd a
proﬁtable deviation, since this must entail a diﬀerent contract, and the A-optimal contract is
already in force.
Currently matched agents cannot match with a diﬀerent principal, because such a principal
would have to be given a proﬁt ˜ π ≥ π.I f˜ π>πthen the agent will do worse, given Lemma 11.
If ˜ π = π the agent cannot do better, given the deﬁnition of the A-optimal contract.
Unmatched viable agents exist if n>mand they have wealth w ≤ wm+1. They cannot match
with any principal because in this case every principal is already getting π ≥ πP(wm). Hence the
constructed allocation is stable.
Next, we argue that every stable allocation must be of this form. Consider ﬁrst property (A).
Suppose there is a stable allocation which violates (A). Then there exists an inactive viable agent
and an inactive principal who can be matched. To show that the richest agents must be matched
suppose to the contrary that this were not true. Then an inactive wealthier agent can match
with a principal currently matching with a poorer agent, and provide the principal with a higher
proﬁt, while generating a higher utility than autarky for itself.
To show that B must be satisﬁed by every stable allocation, we claim ﬁrst that all principals
must obtain the same proﬁt. If this were not true, the principal with the lowest proﬁt could match
with an agent who matches with a principal who obtains a higher proﬁt, and the agent could be
made better oﬀ by increasing vs and vf slightly relative to the existing contract.
45Second, we claim that π ≥ max{πP(wm+1),0} if m<n , because every principal has the
option of matching with the wealthiest agent m+1 who is not matched, or not to contract at all.
Third, we claim π ≤ πP(wm). If not, π>π P(wm). However, the principal who is matched
with the agent m cannot reach this proﬁt level by contracting with agent m, by the deﬁnition of
πP(wm).
Fourth, π =0i fm>n . This follows from the fact that all principals must obtain the same
proﬁt, and some principals must remain inactive and make zero proﬁts (π = 0) because m>n .
Finally, suppose property (C) is violated by a stable allocation. If a matched agent a gets
more than the utility from the A-optimal contract relative to π, this violates the deﬁnition of the
A-optimal contract. If an agent a has lower utility than he can obtain in the A-optimal contract,
then Lemma (12) ensures the existence of a Pareto improving contract for the matched principal
agent pair. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. (i) The problem of selecting the P-optimal contract can be stated
as choosing vf,eto maximize S(e,w) − vf subject to vf ≥ max{Lα,w+ S(R) − α(e)}. Clearly
at the optimum vf = max{Lα,w+ S(R) − α(e)}, and the problem can be reduced to choosing
e alone to maximize S(e,w) − max{Lα,w+ S(R) − α(e)}, i.e., maximize e(Ss − Sf) − CP(e,w)
where CP(e,w) ≡ max{Lα+e D (e),w+S(R)+D(e)} denotes the expected cost to the principal
of implementing e with an agent of wealth w. Hence for e ≤ eα(w) the relevant cost function
is w + S(R)+D(e) and for e>e α(w)i ti sLα + e D (e). Deﬁne w1,w 2 by the property that
eα(w1)=e∗,e α(w2)=eFB. Clearly, the marginal cost equals the derivative of the ﬁrst-best cost
D(e) upto eα(w), and the derivative of e D (e) above eα(w). Note that the S(e,w) function is
maximized at e∗ while F(e,w) is maximized at eFB. It follows that for w<w 1 the optimal eﬀort
is e∗ and only LL binds; for w>w 2 the optimal eﬀort is eFB and only APC binds, while for
intermediate wealths the optimal eﬀort is eα(w) and both constraints bind.
(ii) The A-optimal contract can be reduced to selection of e,vf to maximize vf +α(e) subject
to vf ≥ Lα and S(e,w) − vf ≥ Π. Fix any e: it can be implemented only if S(e,w) ≥ Π+Lα,i n
which case it is optimal to set vf = S(e,w) + Π. Hence the problem reduces to choosing e alone
to maximize S(e,w)+α(e) − Π ≡ F(e,w) − Π, subject to S(e,w) ≥ Lα + Π. Hence if eFB is
implementable this is the optimal eﬀort, otherwise it is the highest e such that S(e,w)=Lα+Π.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
46PROOF OF LEMMA 7 (i) Note ﬁrst that both LL constraints cannot bind simultaneously, as
this would cause the contract to violate APC: with vi = −Gi ≤ M(R) the expected utility of the
agent is bounded above by M(R). The need to provide the agent with positive eﬀort incentives
further implies that vs >v f,s ovf must be strictly smaller than M(R), and therefore the expected
utility of the agent would also be strictly smaller than M(R), compared to the agent’s outside
option of w + M(R) from not participating. It also follows that the LL constraint binds, if at
all, in state f. Otherwise vs = −Gs ≤ M(R) and vf <v s and again APC must be violated. So
in any feasible contract, vs >M (R), and LL cannot bind in state s. If there is bonded labor in
state s, eliminating it (i.e., setting Gs = −M(R), and adjusting ﬁnancial transfers so as to leave
vs unaﬀected) would raise the principal’s expected proﬁt without aﬀecting the agent’s utility or
violating any of the constraints.
(ii) If the APC does not bind in any contract, it is possible for vs and vf to be lowered by an
equal amount  >0, leaving e unchanged. Since LL does not bind in state s, the reduction in vs
is feasible without any need to adjust Gs, and the principal’s payoﬀ in state s is higher. In state
f, if the LL constraint was binding, the reduction in vf necessitates a concomitant increase in Gf
by  . Since r(Gf) is an increasing function, the higher enforcement cost does not outweigh the
direct eﬀect of higher bonded labor, and the principal beneﬁts in state f. Therefore the principal’s
expected proﬁt must rise.
(iii) In order to derive the A-optimal contract, we proceed similar to the analysis of optimal
contracting in a standard moral hazard problem. At the ﬁrst step, we ﬁx an eﬀort level to be
implemented and derive the maximum achievable utility to the agent corresponding to this eﬀort.
Then at the second step, we select the optimal eﬀort. The property in (iii) alludes to the solution
to the ﬁrst stage problem, where the eﬀort level is ﬁxed.
From the IC constraint it follows that V ≡ vf + α(e) and π = w − I + e(ys − yf)+yf − e ·




vf + α(e) (21)
s.t. (PPC’): S(e,w) − vf − (1 − e)Q(Gf) ≥ π∗
(LL’) vf ≥− Gf.
47Rewrite PPC’ to S(e,w) − (1 − e) · Q(Gf) ≥ vf + π∗ ≥− Gf + π∗ where the last inequality
follows from the (LL’) constraint.
This implies that an eﬀort e is implementable by vf and Gf if
S(e,w) − (1 − e) · Q(Gf) ≥− Gf + π∗
⇔ Gf − (1 − e) · Q(Gf) ≥ π∗ − S(e,w). (22)
Note that Q (·) ≤ 1 and the LHS of (22) is accordingly increasing in Gf and goes to ∞ as Gf
goes to ∞. Therefore, any eﬀort e is implementable with suﬃciently large Gf. Since the agent’s
objective function is increasing in vf he will choose the highest vf for any given pair e,Gf. The
highest achievable vf satisﬁes vf = S(e,w)−(1−e)·Q(Gf)−π∗. Inserting this into the objective
function reveals that the agent tries to pick the smallest Gf for any given e. The agent will choose
the smallest implementable Gf (for a given eﬀort e and vf = S(e,w) − (1 − e) · Q(Gf) − π∗)
which is the smallest solution to (22). Note that Gf ≥− M(R), and if no bonded labor is used
then Gf = −M(R), whence Q(−M(R) )=0 .I fa tGf = −M(R), condition (22) is satisﬁed then
no bonded labor will be used. This is equivalent to the condition that S(e,w) ≥ π∗ + M(R). If
this condition is not satisﬁed then bonded labor will be used, and Gf will be set at the unique
solution to (15). This completes the proof of Lemma 7.
PROOF OF LEMMA 8. First note that the ﬁrst term on the RHS of (18) is increasing in
wealth because Q(·) is increasing and K is decreasing in wealth:
Kw =
−Sw(e,w)




1 − (1 − e) · Q (G)
< 0.
Remember that K is the solution to G (where G>−M(R)) in G−(1−e)·Q(G)=π∗ −S(e,w)
and hence K −(1−e)·Q(K)−π∗ +S(e,w)=0 .L e tP(e) ≡ e·(ys −yf)−e·D (e) and we have
Ke =
−P (e) − Q(g)
1 − (1 − e) · Q (g)
(24)
Therefore, Ce is increasing in wealth if (1 − e) · Q (K(e,π∗,w)) · Ke is also increasing in wealth.
This holds if
(1 − e) · Q (K(e,π∗,w)) · Ke =
−P (e) − Q(G)
1 − (1 − e) · Q (G)
· Q (G) (25)
48is decreasing in G because Kw < 0. The derivative of
−P
(e)−Q(G)
1−(1−e)·Q(G) with respect to G is
−Q (G)(1 − (1 − e) · Q (e) )+( P (e)+Q(G)) · (−(1 − e) · Q  (G))




1−(1−e)·Q(g) · Q (G) therefore yields
−Q (G)(1 − (1 − e) · Q (G) )+( P (e)+Q(G)) · (−(1 − e) · Q  (G))
(1 − (1 − e) · Q (G))2 · Q (G) (26)
+
−P (e) − Q(G)
1 − (1 − e) · Q (G)
· Q  (G)
=( −Q (G) · Q (G)(1 − (1 − e) · Q (G)) + Q (G) · (P (e)+Q(G)) · (−(1 − e) · Q  (G))
+(−P (e) − Q(G)) · Q  (G)(1 − (1 − e) · Q (G))) · 1/((1 − (1 − e) · Q (G))2)
=( −Q (G) · Q (G)(1 − (1 − e) · Q (G))
+(−P (e) − Q(G)) · Q  (G)) · 1/((1 − (1 − e) · Q (G))2)
which is nonpositive if
−Q (G) · Q (G)(1 − (1 − e) · Q (G)) (27)
+(−P (e) − Q(G)) · Q  (G) < 0.
This inequality holds if
−Q (G) · Q (G)(1 − Q (G)) − P (e) · Q  (G) ≤ 0 (28)





Q (G)(1 − Q (G))
−P (e)
=
Q (G)(1 − Q (G))
D (e)+e · D  (e) − (ys − yf)
.
For any eﬀort e>e ∗, this is guaranteed by assumption (9). On the other hand, it is easily seen
that no e ≤ e∗ will ever be chosen because any such eﬀort is dominated by e∗ where S(e,w)
is maximized: the ﬁrst-best surplus is higher at e∗ than at any lower eﬀort, and it necessitates
less bonded labor as well as a smaller probability of an unsuccessful state. Hence we can restrict
attention to eﬀort levels above e∗. This completes the proof of Lemma 8.
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